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DENYING SUBROGATION IN PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS:
A NEEDED CHANGE OF DIRECTION
URIEL PROCACCIA*
Insurance subrogation is a growing multimillion dollar concern. Un-
derwriters tend to initiate proceedings against solvent tortfeasors in any
case large 'enough to justify the effort. Although the ratio of net subro-
gation recoveries to net incurred losses varies according to the type of
coverage and the aggressiveness of the insurer,' a growing industry-wide
consciousness of the great potential of subrogation has resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in the aggregate recovery ratio under all coverages.2
From a policy standpoint, the promotion of justice and prevention of
hardstup have been offered to justify the system's existence. Proponents
argue that the tortfeasor's liability is primary while the underwriter's is
only secondary, 3 and that if the secondary obligor has had to pay a
*LL.B, LL.M., Hebrew University; S.J.D., Umversity of Pennsylvania. Lecturer in
Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel; Member, Israeli Bar.
1. TYPE OF COVERAGE YEARS COVERED SUBROGATION RATIO
Low High
Automobile -Collision 1950-1960 7.2% 12.5%
Automobile Fire, Theft 1952-1960 .8% 1.5%
and Comprehensive
Automobile Bodily Injury 1951-1960 .01% .3%
Liability
Automobile Property Damage 1950-1960 .1% .9%
Liability
Straight Fire 1951-1960 .5% 1.3%
Extended Coverage 1955-1960 1.3% 3.0%
Homeowner's Multiple Peril 1957-1960 4.0% 8.0%
Commercial Multiple Peril 1958-1960 0.4% 1.2%
Glass 1952-1960 1.3% 2.3%
Burglary and Theft 1951-1960 0.7% 1.3%
Workmen's Compensation 1950-1960 0.9% 1.5%
Inland Marine 1952-1960 0.3% 2.8%
Fidelity 1950-1960 16.9% 20.0%
Surety 1950-1960 24.8% 37.7%
Horn, Subrogation in Insurance Theory and Practice, 1964 (unpublished doctoral thesis).
Similar figures were collected by this author in 1971 from a small sample of underwriters
doing business in the Philadelplua area.
2. For some evidence of the existence of this upward slope in subrogation activities,
especially with respect to fire insurance, see Sinnott, Subrogation Investigations of Fires
and Explosions, 1962 INs. L.J. 41.
3. See, e.g., Vogemann v. American Dock & Trust Co., 13 App. Div. 216, 115 N.Y.S.
741 (1909); Hampton Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lightsey, 155 S.C. 222, 152 S.E. 425 (1930);
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claim, equity requires that he have recourse against the primary obligor.
Moreover, they observe that mature loss-adjusting mechanisms should
assure due compensation to the victim and effect a just allocation of the
loss by holding a tortfeasor ultimately liable for his actions. Subroga-
ton, it is argued, fulfills these criteria. If, however, the relative equites of
the parties are not in favor of the insurer, and if the victim does not re-
ceive all to which he is entitled, the purpose of subrogation is defeated.
Such a result is evident in the personal injuries area.
From a social perspective, the concept of a double recovery by a
policyholder has been much maligned. Subrogation prevents a double
recovery, but because of the peculiar nature of personal injury accident
loss, where actual indemnity is only rarely achieved, the notion of col-
lecting compensation twice should not be condemned. Since the process
of balancing relative equities was developed judicially when the insur-
ance industry was in its infancy,4 and since subrogation is often treated
as a discretionary remedy rather than as one of right,5 the judicial prece-
dents that have formulated the subrogation system should not be deemed
incontrovertible.
This Article will examine personal injury subrogation in cases with
and without a settlement. General fiscal theory will also be considered,
with special emphasis on better allocation methods in the area than now
exist. The American loss allocation system must lead the way in develop-
ing an equitable alternative to subrogation for personal injury claims.
PERSONAL INJURY SUBROGATION WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT
An uninsured accident victim who has been injured by the fault of
another person may attempt to vindicate his rights in court. A long list
of obstacles, however, obstructs actual monetary recovery through litiga-
tion. Proof of liability is lengthy and costly Court dockets are clogged
with endless lists of cases that await trial and appeal. Moreover, many
final judgments are uncollectible because of the defendant's insolvency 6
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938) But see Security
Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250 Md. 241, 242 A.2d 482 (1968).
4. King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEX. L. REv. 62, 85 (1952).
5. In Ritter v. Cost, 99 Ind. 80 (1884), for example, an alleged subrogee's claim upon
hs insured's mortgage was held to be subordinated to the rights of a "purchaser of a
judgment" who had no notce of the existence of the mortgage. For later developments
m the same jurisdiction, see LaGrange v. Greer Wilkinson Lumber Co., 59 Ind. App.
448, 108 N.E. 373 (1915).
6. No progress seems to have been made in the solution of these problems. Compare
EHRENZWEIG, "FuL AID" INSURANcE FOR THE TRaFric VIctIM (1954), a leading study
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The victim, however, could have purchased an accident insurance
policy covering a part of his economic loss. There are three basic types
of policies available: expense coverage, the most common being a policy
covering hospital expenses and doctors' bills actually incurred by the
insured; income coverage, providing the insured with a guaranteed in-
come in the event of disablement from accidental injury; and fixed sum
policies for the contingencies of death, dismemberment, or loss of sight.7
Common to all these policies is that none is designed to indemnify the
insured for his physical pam, mental anguish, sleepless nights, feelings
of humiliation, or social embarrassment. For such injuries, the insured
must go to court and comfort himself with whatever damages he can
collect from the tortfeasor. In no case, however, can money fully com-
pensate him, especially if "complete" recovery must be sacrificed in the
interest of a quick settlement and avoidance of a difficult courtroom
battle. Furthermore, most insurance coverages do not completely com-
pensate the insured for his out-of-pocket expenses. Thus, the pertinent
policy question is whether a health insurance carrier defraying these ex-
penses should be permitted to reduce his "losses" through subrogation
by claiming a preemptive right in any recovery of the insured from the
tortfeasor.
The positive law in the United States has not reached a definitive
answer to this query, but its direction is toward legitimatizmg subroga-
tion practices. This tendency is most unfortunate.
Early Court Rulings
The problem raised by personal injury insurance subrogation is a com-
paratively recent one. Old English authorities, as well as the modem
ones, have never squarely disposed of the issue. Most English commenta-
tors believe that subrogation cannot be permitted to health insurers" but
concede the lack of a clear holding to that effect.9
concerning automobile crashes, 'wnth RoYAL CoMz'x N O oAuro. I2s., PoviNCE OF Barms
COLUMBIA, REPORT OF Tm ComamissioNEas (1968)
7. See ManH & CA.mAcx, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 469 (4th ed. 1966).
8. E.g., 22 Halsbury's (Simonds) Laws of England 261: "The doctrine of subroga-
ton does not apply to contracts of life insurance and personal accident insurance" But
then, in a footnote, it is said: "There is no direct authority as regards personal accident
insurance: the absence of any right of. subrogation seems, however, to follow from the
principle that personal accident insurance is not a contract of indemnity"
9. In Theobald v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 349 (Ex. 1854),
it was held that where the policy stipulated for payment of '1000 in case of the in-
sured's death, and of a proportionate amount m case of a personal injury, the amount
1973]
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The leading decision disallowing health insurers' subrogation is Gatz-
'weiler v. Milwaukee Electric Ry & Light Co.,10 in which it was
held that in the absence of an express subrogation clause, no subrogation
to health carriers could be sanctioned. The court drew a close analogy
between life and personal injury coverages, holding that in both cases
the policy proceeds are fixed without regard to actual indemnity and,
in the absence of indemnity, subrogation should not be tolerated."
If it can be assumed that life and personal injury coverages are, indeed,
analogous, Gatzweiler's qualified holding, which emphasized the lack of
an express subrogation clause, is incompatible with the analogy An ex-
press subrogation clause should be held ineffective in an accident contract
just as it is in a life policy 12 If an express provision would legitimatize
subrogation, this must mean that there is an inherent distinction between
the two types of coverage. However, no meaningful distinction has yet
been demonstrated. Some courts have reacted sensitively to that realiza-
tion and have denied personal injury subrogation notwithstanding an
express contractual provision,13 but these courts are definitely in the
minority
recoverable for personal injury was the actual damage, but not exceeding £ 1000. In
Bradburn v. Great W Ry., [1874] L.R. 10 Ex. i, the court held that since a personal
injury policy is not a contract of indemmty, the injured party could have recovered from
the tortfeasor without making allowance for insurance proceeds recoverable from the
health carrier.
10. 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W 633 (1908).
11. See City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 101 So. 2d 250 (1958); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 170 P.2d 448 (1946); McAdow v. Kansas City W
Ry, 96 Kan. 423, 151 P. 1113 (1915); American Indem. Co. v. New York Fire & Marine
Underwriters, Inc, 196 So. 2d 592 (La. 1967); Security Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250 Md. 241,
242 A.2d 482 (1968); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1965),
followed m Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.
1967); Holland v. Morley Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 145 A. 142 (1929); State v. Hughes
Oil Co, 58 N.D. 581, 226 N.W 586 (1929); Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio App.
133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939); Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W 374 (1927).
12. Since American law flatly prohibits subrogation to life insurers, the existence
of the clause is irrelevant. Cf. Dworak v. Allstate Ins. Co., 18 IMI. App. 2d 225, 152 N.E.2d
197 (1958), aff'd, 17 Ill. 2d 181, 161 NZE.2d 258 (1959); Security Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250
Md. 241, 242 A.2d 482 (1968).
13. E.g., City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 101 So. 2d 250 (1958); Forsthove
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1967); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1965); Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio
App. 133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939). See also Kimball & Davis, The Extenson of Insurance




A pair of Michigan cases, both styled Michigan Hospztal Service v.
Sharpe,14 marked a great reversal in judicial attitude toward the question
of health insurance subrogation and the beginning of a new era of sub-
rogation permissiveness.15 In Sharpe I, an accident victim had recovered
$2,000 under a Blue Cross hospitalization policy He then sued the tort-
feasor and settled his claim for $18,000 in full satisfaction. In denying
Blue Cross' alleged right of subrogation, the court stated that a contract
of accident insurance is not one of indemnity In addition, the health
carrier's liability was held to be primary rather than secondary, and
therefore a shifting of the economic loss to a third party (the tortfeasor)
was refused.
In Sharpe II, the facts were identical, except that the insurer had in-
cluded an express subrogation clause in the policy The court rejected
the contention that subrogation would unjustly enrich the health car-
rier and concluded that to hold "that the subrogation clause gave
plaintiff no rights whatsoever is to read it out of the agreement by ren-
dering it meaningless. This a court may not do." 16 Since, in the absence
of an express clause, subrogation against the tortfeasor had been held un-
enforceable, and because the third party's rights could not have been af-
fected adversely by an agreement to which he had not consented, the
carrier's subrogation was held to be enforceable only as against the in-
sured. In other words, the insured's recovery from the third party had
to be given to the successful subrogee.
It is submitted that Sharpe II is bad law Considering the two cases
together, the earlier Sharpe rests on two distinct grounds. First, the
health coverage was held not to be a contract of indemnity; thus, re-
covery from the third party was held insufficient to make the insured
whole again, and therefore an additional collection from a collateral
source could not unjustly enrich or confer a windfall benefit upon the
insured. Second, the insurer's liability was said to be "primary " This
means that the insurer, vis-a-vis the third party, could not have claimed
that he had paid the tortfeasor's debt, as he could if he were the surety
and the third party his principal debtor; in short, the "relative- equi-
ties" were determined in favor of the third party
Although the first ground denies subrogation because- of the judicial
commitment to do the utmost to assure the victim's indemnification, the
14. 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W3d 638 (1954); 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954).
15. See also Barrneier v. Oregon Physicians' Serv, 194 Ore. 659,.243 P.2d 1053 (1952).
16. 339 Mich. at 577, 64 N.W.2d at 714.
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second rationale focuses upon the third party, recognizing his right to
immunity from subrogation regardless of the insured's indemnification.
If this analysis is correct, there is no way to justify the second Sharpe
decision. Since the Blue Cross coverage could not have indemnified the
insured, a preemptive right given to Blue Cross in the third party re-
covery would unjustly enrich Blue Cross at the insured's expense. More-
over, an express clause should not operate to reverse the result. Courts
should be free to disregard the clause, as is done routinely in the other
nomndemmty line, life insurance.' 7 If the relative equities of the parties
are in favor of the tortfeasor rather than the underwriter, it is difficult
to understand why the former should pay the injured party's claim if
such payment will benefit only the insurer.
The court conceded that there was no direct right of recovery by Blue
Cross against the wrongdoer. Although this proposition was prompted
by a desire to allocate a known economic loss in an appropriate manner,
the objective clearly was frustrated by the sanctioning of a similar result
through a circuity of action.
The Aftermath of Sharpe
The distinction which the Sharpe decisions drew between insurance
policies containing express subrogation clauses and those without such
clauses brought about a proliferation of subrogation clauses' and a rapid
adoption of the Sharpe I1 holding in the majority of jurisdictions where
the question arose.19 In many cases, courts opted to follow Sharpe II with
no intelligible attempt to illuminate the problem with independent rea-
17. E.g, City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 101 So. 2d 250 (1958).
18. One interesting clause, to be found in the contracts of the Oregon Physician's
Service (O.P.S.), an orgamzation similar in its objectives and methods to Blue Cross,
reads:
The benefits of this contract do not apply to any injury or illness of the
member caused by the negligence or wrongful act of any other person,
except to the extent that if the member shall make all reasonable efforts
to recover from such other person O.P.S. will procure for the member
the benefits of this contract which cannot be made available out of funds
reasonably recoverable from, or through, such other person. Such funds
shall be deemed not reasonably recoverable from, or through, such other
person if it shall reasonably appear that should an action therefor be prose-
cuted, and judgment therefor obtained, against such person execution
on such judgment would be unavailable.
See Barmeier v. Oregon Physician's Serv., 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (1952).
19. For a notation of this development, see Barry, Subrogation of Medical Payment
Clams, 17 FEDERATioN oF INs. ComaNsE 46 (1967)
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sonmg.2° The most prevalent rationale given by courts to explain their
position is that subrogation is a by-product of actual indemmty It is
argued that since the health insurance contract covers exactly the mdem-
nifiable portions of the insured's loss-lost income and out-of-pocket ex-
penses, there is no reason why the insured should collect twice for a liqui-
,dated expenditure which is so easily ascertained and so clearly docu-
mented.21
This argument generally has been accepted with enthusiasm by aca-
demic writers, 22 but it is nevertheless fallacious. Its flaw lies in the fact
that the concept of indemnity is analyzed from the wrong direction. As
far as the insurance company is concerned, the loss was ascertainable and
liquidated, and the policy proceeds completely cover it. Unliquidated
(uninsured) portions of the loss are not within the interest of the carrier
and should not, from its point of view, be of any concern. It is the in-
sured, however, and not the insurance carrier, who should be indemnified.
Subrogation is permitted in the property insurance lines in order to
avoid a double recovery by one who actually has been ind'emnified. As
has been demonstrated, however, an accident victim is often indemnified
for only one portion of his loss, usually the most insignificant one. From
his point of view, the ascertamability of Ins out-of-pocket expenses and
its reimbursement do not, and cannot, affect indemnification. For ex-
ample, assume an accident has resulted in the loss of an eye to the in-
sured. If the tortfeasor's solvency was limited to $500, approximately
the cost of hospital and doctors' bills, the modest third party recovery
will be consumed by the health carrier, leaving the insured completely
"indemnified" with regard to his actual expenses,2 3 but with no recovery
for other portions of Is loss.24
20. Silinsky v. State Wide Ins. Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968); Dem-
mery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232 A.2d 21 (1967); State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969); Associated
Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225
(1967) (expressly distinguishing the Gatzweiler case on the ground that in Gatveiler
the health carrier did not have the foresight to incorporate an express clause in its
policy).
21. E.g., DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1966); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 32 Oluo App. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d 755 (1964). The idea first appeared in
a dissenting opinion in Sharpe L
22. See Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept?, 28 INs.
COUNSEL J. 276 (1961). See also Horn, supra note 1, at 139, 220.
23. Even this assumption may be shaken in the case of a settlement between the in-
sured and a third party. See notes 46-62 infra & accompanying text.
24. This idea can be extended in certain circumstances to property insurance. Sup-
pose, for example, that an insured owns two houses, each worth $50,000, and that he
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Furthermore, even if the third party's resources are sufficient to meet
a judgment entered against him, including maximum recovery for pain
and suffering, the idea that this represents indemnity still would be mis-
leading. From the point of view of the accident victim, such a judgment
represents a liquidated sum, consisting of compensation for the mdem-
nifiable expenses, and an unliquidated amount payable for pain and suf-
fering. The combination of these two amounts is necessarily unliqui-
dated, unascertamable and, therefore, umndemnifiable. Thus, the con-
cept of indemnity can be sustained only from the indemnifier's view-
point; it cannot be supported from the perspective of the one to be "in-
demnified." 25
Personal Injury Subrogation and Workmen's Compensation
The misguided theory that subrogation should be permitted for liqui-
dated portions of a loss resulting from personal injury is carried beyond
litigation into almost all workmen's compensation schemes. In most
jurisdictions, a tortfeasor cannot be held liable more than once for the
same wrongful act. Therefore, an employee cannot possibly sue him
for general damages and leave the litigation for medical expenses and
loss of earnings to the workmen's compensation carrier.26 Hence, the
has purchased a fire policy to protect only one of them. If a tortfeasor whose solvency
is limited to $50,000 causes a fire that completely demolishes both houses, his limited
resources could either be channeled to indemnify the insured for his actual loss or
made to satisfy the subrogation claim of the fire underwriter, thereby rendering the
insurance policy economically valueless. Conceding that the first alternative is preferable,
an analogous result should be encouraged in the field of health insurance.
25. There are additional reasons advanced for the adoption of the Sharpe II rule. Some
courts say that there could not possibly be a valid public interest against the promulga-
tion and enforcement of subrogation clauses, for otherwise the state insurance commis-
sioner would certainly have refused to allow their insertion into policies. Associated
Hosp. Serv. Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225
(1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v Lutz, 32 Ohio App. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d 755 (1964). This
judicial dependency upon the use of. administrative discretion, without any evidence that
the commissioner's attention has even been directed to the question, is inappropriate.
Other courts declare that since assignments of tort actions for personal injuries are
permissible in a given jurisdiction, conventional subrogation also should be tolerated.
Davenport v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8i Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965). This ap-
proach obviously ignores the question whether an assignment of a subrogation right
should be permitted m the first instance. There is also the popular argument that sub-
rogation penalizes wrongdoing by allocating the financial consequences of a tort to
its originator, hopefully reducing premiums by so doing. Hospital Serv. Corp. v Penn-
sylvania Ins. Co., 101 R.I. 708, 227 A.2d 105 (1967) The flaw in this theory is that it
incorrectly identifies technical fault with moral turpitude.
26. E.g., King v. Chicago M. & St. P Ry., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W 1113 (1900) Compare
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victim can recover just one lump sum from the tortfeasor, which in
many cases would be an amount less than his actual loss. 27 Considering
tis, should the employer or his liability carrier be permitted full reim-
bursement for "losses" by having a preemptive right in the third party
recovery If so, should allowance then be made for the employee's re-
covery expenses and attorney's fees, or must the employee shoulder these
expenses alone? The answer varies among jurisdictions.
in most states, the employer (or his carrier) is entitled to a full refund
of benefits previously paid to the employee. In some jurisdictions, the
employee is not even permitted to keep the excess over that amount,
on the theory that the carrier should be given an incentive to con-
duct the third party litigation and not settle for an undersized recovery 28
A much more desirable system was promulgated in Florida. There, if the
employee relinquishes control of the litigation to his employer, the lat-
ter's subrogative pursuits are fully legitimatized. If, however, the victim
conducts the proceedings on his own, the statute provides:
Upon suit being filed [against the third party], the employer or
the insurance carner may file in the suit a notice of payment of
compensation and medical benefits to the employee which
shall be recorded and the same shall constitute a lien upon any
judgment recovered to the extent that the court may determine to
be their pro rata share for compensation benefits paid or to be
paid based upon such equitable distribution of the amount
recovered as the court may determine, less their pro rata share of
all court costs expended by the plaintiff including reasonable
attorney's fees for plaintiff's attorney 29
Some experts have expressed disapproval of the broad discretion the
Florida statute gives to the courts,3o because it necessarily results in
Patterson & Colvin, Injury to Persons and Property-One Action or Tswo?, 2 ALA. L. Rxv.
75 (1949), 'with Brunsden v. Humphrey, [1884] 14 Q.B. 141 (CA.).
27. "Legal 'compensation' for personal injuries does not actually compensate. Not
many people would sell an arm for the average or even the maximum amount that juries
award for the loss of an arm. Moreover, the injured person seldom gets the compen-
sation he 'recovers', for a substantial attorney's fee usually comes out of it. There is a
limit to what a negligent wrongdoer can fairly, i.e., consistently with the balance of
individual and social interests, be required to pay" Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
28. A. LARsoN, TBi LAW oF WoRKMzN's ComPENSATioN § 74.31 (1970).
29. FlA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39(3)(a) (1966). For an example of the operation of the
statute, see Hartford Accident Indem. Co. v. McNair, 152 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1963).
30. E.g., A. LARSON, supra note 28.
1973]
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confusion and lack of certainty, and mght invite abuse. For example,
the figure claimed by the injured -employee as his actual damages might
be used to apportion the third party recovery 3 1 A literal use of the
Florida statute, however, can easily avoid these pitfalls, and in the ab-
sence of abuse, it is much more progressive than some of its widely ac-
cepted counterparts. Not only does the statute recognize in principle
the possibility that subrogation should be linuted when justice so re-
quires, but it also specifically allows for the actual expenses and attorney's
fees incurred by the insured. In the absence of such a provision, most
jurisdictions would not make that allowance, with the result that the
employee would receive what remains after a full deduction of court ex-
penses, attorney's fees (usually amounting to about one-third of the
gross recovery), and the insurance carrier's "losses." 32
Personal Injury Subrogation and the Collateral Source Rule
The constant expansion of subrogation in the personal injury area is
not umversally accepted. On a closely related question, the overwhelming
weight of authority is opposed to the current tendency to accept Sharpe
II as positive law This related doctrine is known as the collateral source
rule. Generally deplored by academic writers,33 the doctrine dictates that
if the insured has recovered from someone other than the tortfeasor for
some compensable consequences of his loss, allowance should not be
made in the computation of damages against the third party for such
previous recoveries3 4 The benefits paid or payable by the collateral
source may be numerous. They include the continued retention of an
injured employee on his employer's payroll, a complete defrayal of hos-
pital and doctors' bills, life and accident insurance benefits, and social
31. E.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 131 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1961)
This holding places an obvious prermum on inflated suits.
32. A. LAssoN, supra note 28, § 74.32. But see Southern Quarries & Contracting Co.
v. Hensley, 313 Ky 640, 232 S.W.2d 999 (1950), where the court allowed for attorney's
fees but otherwise recogmzed the insurer's preemptive right by subrogation over the
victim's residuary interest in the proceeds of recovery
The carrier can thus clearly profit from the proceedings initiated by the victim against
the third party, but he cannot lose. If the victim loses his lawsuit or if the judgment
is uncollectible, the carrier is under no obligation to share the expenses of the litigation.
33. See Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation m Tort Law, 54 CA.
L. REv. 1478 (1966); West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's
Windfall, 16 OiKA. L. REv. 395 (1963). Both authors deplore the "unjust ennchment" of
or "double recovery" by the accident victim and strongly recommend subrogating the
collateral source to the extent of the value of the benefits he has provided. See also 63
HAv. L. REv. 330 (1949).
34. For a complete compilation of cases, see Annor., 7 A.L.R.3d 516 (1966)
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benefits such as pensions, workmen's compensation awards and social
security 35 Against ths background, the question is raised whether the
tortfeasor should nevertheless pay his victim as if none of these benefits
were conferred.
In most western countries, social benefits are the rule rather than the
exception, and the question is therefore heavily litigated. Almost unam-
mously, the law in countries such as France, Germany, Switzerland, and
Israel36 permits a full recovery notwithstanding a previous conferrai of
collateral benefits. In all these countries, however, the injured party be-
comes liable to a subrogation claim brought by the collateral source.
English law is unclear, but it seems to recognize the collateral source
rule37 while denying subrogation.-3 In light of all relevant factors, this is
clearly a preferable arrangement.
The law in this country recognizes the collateral source rule in three
discernible versions.39 According to one line of authority, the torifeasor
should not be permitted to exploit the relationship between his victim
and the collateral source. He is not allowed, therefore, to deduct the
value of the collateral benefits from the damages recovered. However,
since it is considered disadvantageous to confer upon the injured plain-
tiff the windfall of a double satisfaction, the collateral source is permitted
to be subrogated to the amount collected from the third party 40
35. West, supra note 33.
36. See Tedeschi, Wrongdoer, Injured Party and Third Party Indemnifier: An Israel
Law on Personal InjurIes, 15 INf'L & CoMp. L.Q. 1195 (1966).
37. In Parry v. Cleaver, 1 All E.R. 555 (HL.) (1969), a policeman was injured by
the defendant's negligent conduct. The defendant contended that from the plaintiff's
damages for loss of income, the pension payable by the police force should be deducted.
The House of Lords held that the pension fund was paid for by the accrued wages of
policemen and therefore should be regarded as accrued withheld wages rather than as
unaccrued future wages.
38. In Metropolitan Police Dist. Receiver v. Craydon, I All ER. 78 (CA.) (1957), the
court held that the employer can be subrogated only to the injured employee's rights.
The employee, being paid his full salary during disability, was not entitled to sue for
loss of earnings, which was fatal to the employer's subrogation claim. Note, however,
the apparent inconsistency between this decision and Parry v. Cleaver, 1 All ER. 555
(H..) (1969).
39. In a minority of jurisdictions, the rule is not recognized at all. See, e.g., Feeley v.
Unted States, 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964). The Court in Feeley held that the tortfeasor
was not liable under Pennsylvama law to the accident victim for items of damage reim-
bursed by the Veterans' Administration.
The threefold approach to the collateral source rule as discussed in the text refers to
jurisdictions recognizmg it in one way or another.
40. Motts v. Michigan Cab Co., 274 Mich. 437, 264 N.W 855 (1936). See also Squires
v. Board of County Road Comm'rs, 378 Mich. 613, 147 N.W.2d 65 (1967); Royer v.
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The New York theory presents a slightly different solution. If the
source of the collateral benefits is a fund to which the victim contributed
(for example, a voluntary group employees' emergency fund), the rule
is recognized, because the injured party's additional protection was pur-
chased personally and was not intended for the wrongdoer's benefit. If
the benefits were conferred gratuitously with no corresponding right
of subrogation, however, application of the collateral source rule is
considered unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.41
A third approach follows the English model and applies the collateral
source rule while denying subrogation. For courts adhering to this
theory, it is irrelevant whether the collateral source had paid gratuitously
or in consideration for a quid pro quo.42 The reasons for this are two-
fold: first, subrogation negates making an allowance for attorney's fees
paid by the victlm, 43 and, second, subrogation assigns a dollar value
to the victim's health that is never sufficient to give the victim full com-
pensation.44
The third approach is clearly to be preferred. Recognizing that the
price most juries attach to physical injury is almost always undercompen-
sating, that many cases are settled for less than what would have been
awarded in court, and that one-third of that unsatisfactory amount may
go to the plaintiff's attorney, it is difficult to accept the reasoning of either
of the first two collateral source theories.
All of the arguments for the application of the collateral source rule
and against subrogation of the collateral source apply also in the situation
under consideration. The only pertinent factual difference is that if the
Eskovitz, 358 Mich. 279, 100 N.W.2d 306 (1960); City of Detroit v. Bridgeport Brass Co.,
28 Mich. App. 74, 184 N.W.2d 278 (1970).
41. E.g., Silinsky v State Wide Ins. Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968).
The same result was held to apply where there was a theoretically enforceable right of
subrogation without an indication of an intention to vindicate that right. Coyne v. Camp-
bell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 NE.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
42. E.g., Johnson v. Rhuda, 156 Me. 370, 164 A.2d 675 (1960).
43. "The collateral source rule partially serves to compensate for the attorney's share,
and does not actually render 'double recovery' for the plaintiff." Helfend v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 12, 465 P.2d 61, 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 180 (1970). See
also Jones v. California Cas. Indem. Exch., 13 Cal. App. 3d 1, 91 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1970).
44. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Burke v. Byrd, 188 F Supp. 384
(N.D. Fla. 1960); Roth v. Chados, 97 Conn. 282, 116 A. 332 (1922); Paradis v Paradis,
150 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1963); Taylor v. Jennison, 335 S.W.2d 902 (Ky 1960); Plank v.
Summers, 203 Md. 552, 102 A.2d 262 (1954). One Michigan case, although citing Motts
v. Michigan Cab Co., 274 Mich. 437, 264 N.W 855 (1936), with apparent approval, applied
the collateral source rule without indication of a pending subrogation pursuit. Canning
v. Hannaford, 373 Mich. 41, 127 N.W.2d 851 (1964) Accord, Bunda v. Hardwick, 376
Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1966).
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insured has had the foresight to purchase additional protection in the
form of an accident insurance policy, and if he has paid for that policy
out of his own pocket, he should expect his legal position to be better
than that of a gratuitous beneficiary, who has not acted prudently nor
paid for the additional benefit. It would indeed be unjust, however, to
put a collateral source which has voluntarily cared for an injured accident
victim in a worse position than that of a calculating insurer, which may be
presumed to have rejected all applications that have not met its standard
expectations and which has charged all its policyholders the full cost of
and a profit for underwriting the risk involved. 45
45. The subrogation problem in personal injury lines is not always solved in a simple
manner; its solution vanes according to the stand the jurisdiction has taken on the issue
of the Sharpe cases. There is a great variety of difficult problems that will have to be re-
solved according to the personal conviction and philosophy of the court, often without
the aid of precedent.
For example, if a state statute subrogated an employer's liability carrier against a third
party who had wrongfully injured an employee and fixed the amount of the subrogation
recovery as equal to the compensation paid to the injured employee, the third party
could argue that an amount of recovery reached without his consent, in proceedings
to which he was not a party, cannot constitutionally determine the limts of his own
liability It is submitted that the personal well-being of the parties justifies an acceptance
of such an argument. See CAL. LABoR CODE §§ 3850 et seq. (West 1955); Lasky, Expanded
Scope of Recovery in Industrial Third Party Litigation, 41 CAL. S.B.J. 383 (1966).
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions operation of the comparatively novel "uninsured
motorist" coverage in the subrogation context has not been lltigated. Should an uninsured
motorist carrier be subrogated to the insured's rights against a negligent uninsured motor-
ist, which would probably result mn the latter's destitution, or should the motorist's liability
be relaxed for the reasons noted in the text? The major reason that can be advanced
against recognition of subrogation n this context is that since most uninsured motorist
clauses subrogate the carrier to all of the third party recovery, apparently including the
portion allowable to pain and suffering and other uninsured portions of the loss, there is
a resulting unfair exploitation of unsuspecting insurance consumers. See Kisling v. M.F.A.
Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1966).
Thirdly, what should be done with statutory provisions subrogating the insurer to
third party recoveries allocable to uninsured portions of the loss? If the statutory pro-
tection seriously intends to protect the insured, circuitous action which leaves the in-
sured with the same recovery as if no insurance had existed would certainly frustrate
the statutory purpose. If the statutory purpose were any different, it would have de-
prived the insured of property without due process of law. See Jordan v. Orcutt, 279
Mass. 413, 181 N.E. 661 (1932).
Finally, may a casualty carrier be subrogated, statutorily or otherwise, to recoveries
made by the dependents of a deceased insured who died as a result of the wrongful
act? In spite of the universal denial of. subrogation to life underwriters, some state
statutes seem to confer such subrogative rights. See Pennsylvania Workmen's Compen-
sation Act § 319, PA. STAT. tit. 77, § 561 (1952); Anderson v. Borough of Greenville, 442
Pa. 11, 273 A.2d 512 (1971) A narrow construction of such statutes would seem proper
in light of the ideas heretofore expressed.
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THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SETTLEMENT
BETWEEN THE INSURED AND THE THIRD PARTY
In the personal injury insurance context, where the victim's expenses
are sometimes indemnified but his original pre-accident condition almost
never restored, a quick settlement recovery may alleviate the plight of
many claimants. The dollar volume of a settlement recovery obviously
may be smaller than the conceivable maximum, but it is certainly
much larger, and more quickly obtained, than the conceivable minimum.
Thus, an unrehabilitated accident victim may feel a need to avail him-
self of what may be offered to him in a reasonable settlement proposal.
Nevertheless, American law seems to discourage settlements between in-
sured victims and potential defendants by limiting the insurer's liability to
the amount of the settlement. Allowance is not made to accommodate
the insured's own sacrifice of being less than actually indemnified. This
policy has obvious adverse social repercussions. Its ramifications are par-
ticularly burdensome in the personal injury context, where victims gen-
erally need immediate compensation for their losses.
Early Decisions
Since subrogation is said to be a derivative rather than an independent
right, a settlement discharging the third party's obligation to the insured
also fixes the rights of the insured vis-a-vis the underwriter. 4" In a series
of English decisions, the destruction of the underwriter's subrogation
claim against the tortfeasor was held to create a restitutionary right in
the paid insurance proceeds, or a pro tanto discharge in payable insur-
ance proceeds, whichever was applicable.
In Horse, Carrage & General Ins. Co Ltd. v. Petch,47 the insured
purchased insurance coverage on his automobile and on the life of his
brother. Subsequently, the brother was killed and the automobile dam-
aged in a traffic accident. The company paid the insured C 81 for the
car and a negligible sum for the death of his brother. The policyholder
46. This unanimous result may be reached regardless of the terms of the settlement.
Thus, where an insured released a tortfeasor for a token recovery of his $50 deductible,
it was held that the settlement also was final as to the underwriter. Gulf Ins. Co. v.
Wlute, 242 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1951) One possible exception exists where the third party
has been aware of the pending subrogation claim at the time of the settlement. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co, 268 N.C. 503, 151 S.E.2d 14 (1966) But
see Inter Ins. Exch. v. Anderson, 331 Ill. App. 250, 73 N.E.2d 12 (1947), where it was
held that the duty to protect the insurer's subrogative expenditures rests solely on the
insured.
47. 33 T.L.R. 131 (1916).
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-then collected from the third party tortfeasor an unapportioned sum
of C 1250, which amount probably was less than his actual damage. The
court held that the insured party's failure to apportion the recovery into
subrogable and nonsubrogible items created a presumption that the value
of the car had been fully compensated and allowed subrogaton for C 81.
This decision crystallized earlier cases that supported the proposition in
a more nebulous way 4
Early American law also considered the legal consequences of a settle-
ment, declaring that it effects a -pro tanto discharge of the insurance
policy.49 Tis was held to follow from the nature of the policy as an in-
demity contract not intended to bestow upon the insured more than
actual compensation for his loss."
The Conflict Between Doctrinal Theory and Practice
Most of the cases indicated above, on which recent decisions now rely,
were decided in the context of property insurance rather than in the
personal injury insurance context. It would appear that in situations
where the insured's property has been fully covered by insurance, early
judicial pronouncements are doubtlessly valid; a discharge having been
effected, the only. contestants to the recovered fund are a fully mdemm-
fled insured and a loss-sustaining insurance company A subordination
of the latter's subrogative pursuit to the former's claim for a windfall
double recovery would not serve any legitimate purpose and would
merely increase the moral hazard. The same holdings, however, would
be inapposite in the typical personal injuries situation.
Suppose, for instance, that an automobile accident victim had to be
hospitalized for one month and miss work for five years and also that
his car was partially or completely wrecked. Suppose further that the
victim's first-party automobile coverage pays him $2,000 for the dam-
aged property and that the driver of the other car contests his liability
but is ready to pay $20,000 for the sake of a quick settlement. Finally,
assume that the victim's actual losses amount to $30,000 in expenses, plus
'an unknown amount for pain and suffering. The victim's attorney ad-
vises him that recovery would be rather doubtful and extremely slow,
48. In Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Spooner, [1905] 2 K.B. 753, the insured released a
confiscating authority from the duty to pay damages -for the confiscation. The release
had not served any legitimate purpose and merely destroyed the insurer's right of sub-
xogation. See also West of Eng. Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] 1 Q.B. 226, where there
was a double recovery by the insured.
49. Atlantic Ins. Co. v: Storrow, 5 Paige 285 (N.Y. 1835).
50. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v,-Erie Ry., 73 N.Y. 399 (1878).
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and since he cannot afford to wait so long for the mere hope of a larger
recovery, he accepts the settlement. After having paid a 25 percent
contingency fee and five percent for recovery expenses, the victim is left
with $14,000. The property insurer then asserts its subrogation right to
recoup its $2,000 loss; if successful, this leaves the victim with $12,000.
The insufficiency of the victim's compensation is manifest. 51
These realities pass unheeded by American courts, and the general
praise of subrogation continues. Two major schools of thought have de-
veloped. One, slightly better entrenched than the other, pernuts subro-
gation to its fullest extent notwithstanding either the terms of the settle-
ment or the recovery expenses.52 This generosity toward insurers clearly
penalizes the victim. Upon the assumption that in most severe accident
cases the third party is neither totally insolvent nor sufficiently affluent
to pay for the entire loss,53 settlement looms large as a realistic alternative
to litigation. There is little sense in litigating when a defendant cannot
afford more than what he proposes by way of settlement. Thus, the lib-
eral judicial approach to subrogation channels the third party's limited
resources away from a true compensation situation to the economic detri-
51. This hypothetical situation is rather common. In cases of light injuries, most vic-
tans' economc losses are attributable to "medical loss," which includes hospitalization,
surgery, doctors' bills and the like. Only a smaller portion is allocable to loss of income.
Thus, where the economic loss ranges from $1 to $500, 68.4 percent is allocable to
medical loss and only 27.2 percent to loss of income. The picture is entirely different in
cases of severe injury. In accidents entailing an econormc loss of $25,000 or more, only
21 percent is attributable to medical loss, but 65.4 percent is lost income. AUromoBILE
PFasoN Lr IN URY CLAiMS Table IV-l, at 29 (1970). In spite of what these statistics show,
the risk of medical loss is much more heavily insured than the risk of lost income. Out
of $6.1 billion of health insurance benefits paid to Americans in 1968, $1.3 billion was
paid for loss of earnings. Benefits paid by casualty companies (totaling $805 million in
1968) are apportioned similarly INsnlTnE oF LEm INsURANCE, Lius INsURAN E FAcr BooK
52-53 (1970). This shows that in cases of severe injuries, the major part of the economic
loss is uninsured.
The term "econormc loss" does not include general damages such as pain and suffer-
ing, which usually are much larger than economic loss. This means that only a com-
paratively insignificant portion of the total loss is made good by the health carrier, the
attempted subrogee. Nor do victims of severe accidents fare much better in their
attempts to be indemnified by sources other than their own health carriers. The most
seriously injured one percent of all accident victims account for six percent of the total
econormc losses in all automobile crashes, yet they recover only one percent of the total
recoveries for all crashes. Since theirs is also the heaviest noneconomic loss, the ratio
of their actual recoveries to the true total loss is being even further reduced.
52. Illinois Auto. Ins. Exch. v. Braun, 280 Pa. 550, 124 A. 691 (1924).
53. This assumption seems very realistic. Many insured motorists carry only $10,000
coverage per victim, with a maximum of $20,000 per two or more victims. After ex-
haustion of tlus rmmal fund, most motorists would remain virtually judgment proof.
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ment of the insured, thereby frustrating the economic purpose of the
insurance policy
Nevertheless, the courts are adamant. Judges frequently presume that,
had it not been for the settlement, a larger recovery would have been
forthcoming; thus, they impose upon the insured the obligation to defeat
that presumption, a burden which, in reality, amounts to a virtual im-
possibility As one New Jersey court has stated:
[TIhe policy condition presently under consideration contem-
plates no qualifications on the undertaking assumed by the assured
wuch would place a burden on the carrier of establishing af-
firmatively the existence of any particular degree of likelihood
of recovery against the third person. It may well be that if the in-
sured, m the litigation with the carrier, could establish conclusive-
ly or overwhelmingly the absence of any liability case against the
third person, the breach of condition might be held merely tech-
ical and not effective to absolve the carrier of its liability on the
policy 54
Only in a few holdings adhering to the approach expressed by the
New Jersey decision have the courts consented to an allocation of a part
of the litigation costs and attorney's fees to the subrogation beneficiary 5
Similarly, the victim's hope for adequate compensation has been frus-
trated by judicial apportionments of his total recovery into subrogable
and nonsubrogable items.56 This is an absolute impossibility in cases of
settlement.
A second line of authority makes an important concession to the in-
sured victin. It treats the settlement interchangeably as a breach of the
insurance contract or as a tort committed against the underwriter and
imposes upon the insurer the duty to prove his damages.57 Thus, if the
54. Rogers v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 52 N.J. Super. 254, 145 A.2d 344 (Super.
Ct. 1958).
55. See, e.g., Klacik v. Kovacs, III N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (Super. Ct. 1970);
Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 P.2d 569 (1958).
56. See, e.g., Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d
316 (1942); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 360 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1962); Iowa
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 P.2d 659 (1958).
57. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N.Y. 162, 158 N.E. 60 (1927). See also Vir-
gna Metal Prod. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co, 219 F.2d 931 (2d Cir.
1955); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 153 Conn. 415, 216 A.2d 828 (1966); Washington
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 233 Miss. 33, 100 So. 2d 852 (1958); Century Ins.
Co. v. Joachim, 17 N.J. Misc. 229, 8 A.2d 191 (Dist. Ct. 1939); Pasley v. American Sur.
Co., 253 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1952). Cf. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Home, 45 Tenn. App. 711,
326 S.W.2d 141 (1959).
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third party's liability or his solvency cannot be established, the under-
writer would not be able to prove his actual loss, and no subrogation re-
covery would be permitted.
This approach could easily be extended one step further to produce
a better result. If, indeed, a settlement is treated as a wrong committed
against the underwriter, one should begin by defining the legal duty
allegedly breached by the settlement rather than by assuming the breach
and computing damages. The mere commencement of an action against
the third party obviously does not constitute a breach, even if the tort-
feasor were judicially declared not liable.5" In many jurisdictions, where
splitting the cause of action for the same wrongful act is not permitted, 59
even a settlement including an 'express stipulation between the plaintiff-
insured and defendant-tortfeasor purporting to leave the underwriter's
rights intact still results in the destruction of the insurer's subrogation
right.60 This indicates that sometimes the impairment of the subrogation
right as a result of settlement cannot be avoided. In such situations, the
insured's conduct does not seem to be sufficiently reprehensible to justify
the finding of a tort. Nor would the typical situation of a settlement with
an alleged wrongdoer whose liability is unknown and whose solvency is
limited warrant such a conclusion, especially if the settlement was moti-
vated by econonuc and personal needs. Only in cases of obvious reckless-
ness in the conduct of litigation or negotiations toward settlement can
an attachment of liability be justified.61
The reasons for requiring at least an allocation of legal fees between
insurer and insured should be even more obvious. Unless these unavoid-
able expenses are fully considered for subrogation purposes, as presently
they are not, even in the more advanced statutory schemes,'- they clear-
ly are detrimental to the victim's indemnity Since subrogation is tolerated
to avoid a double recovery, and since fees and costs prevent mdemmty,
58. E.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 67 N.J. Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120
(Super. Ct. 1961).
59. See, e.g., Pratt v. Radford, 52 Wis. 114, 8 N.W 606 (1881). But see Le Blond
Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478, 171 N.E. 414
(1929) See generally Kessner, Federal Court Interpretation of the Real Party in Interest
Rule n Cases of Subrogation, 39 Nn. L. Rav. 452 (1960); Lalonde, Subrogation Claims in
Insurance and the Real Party in Interest Statute, 16 MoNr. L. REv. 101 (1955).
60. E.g., Transamerican Freight Lines v. Quimby, 381 Mich. 149, 160 N.W.2d 865
(1968).
61. See Davis v. MacRitchie, [19381 4 D.L.R. 187.
62. Jones & Brobston, The Employer's Liability for Attorney's Fees n Third Party
Actions, 26 ALA. LAw 296 (1965); McBride, Workmen's Compensation Subrogation
Suits: Allocation of Counsel Fees, 28 U. Pitr. L. REv. 503 (1967).
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these expenses should not be apportioned between the victim and his
carrier. They should be borne by the carrier alone.
STATUTORY SUBROGATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES: CONFUSED EcoNoMIc POLICY
Since personal injuries present serious social and economic problems,
different schemes have been devised to alleviate the suffering of accident
victims. Foremost are monetary contributions by federal and state gov-
ernments, accident funds, and workmen's compensation boards. The fi-
nancial sources of these funds vary according to the fiscal policy of the
statute creating them. The fund may be financed by the general public
through taxation, by the beneficiary of the statutory protection, by the
enterprises creating the risk, or by particular segments of society 63
Subrogation shifts the cost of an accident from the insurance fund
to the subrogation target. Sometimes the overall fiscal ramifications are
hardly noticeable. For example, if the fund were created by contribu-
tions of employees and subrogation shifted the cost of an accident to a
negligent automobile driver, the cost would be shifted to a member of
the motoring community, the composition of which would not be much
different from the community of employees. Although the cost is borne
by the same people, it is somewhat larger due to the expense of additional
recovery Sometimes, however, subrogation may frustrate the statutory
fiscal policy, as it does when it shifts the cost from a fund financed by
general taxation to the motoring community
'Examination of the numerous statutory plans in the field of personal
injuries is beyond the scope of this Article. Attention should be called,
however, to the existence of the fiscal problem and its connection with
the particular machinery devised for loss allocaton and distribution. 'If
it is considered socially advantageous, to allocate economic burdens re-
sulting from certain- accidents to -a-special segment of society, then- any
statutory reallocation that shifts those burdens to other segments must
b'e considered socially counterproductive., On the otherrhand, if the ulti-
mate allocation through subrogaton is the socially desirable, one, then the
initial presubrogation allocaton appartus must be considered economical-
ly wasteful,
Subrogation by the Federal Government
An- excellent ilustrftion of this problem -is presented in cases of. gov-
63. Fnedinaln, Sbcial Jnsurazce and 'tke Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HtAv. L. REv.
241 (1949).
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ernmental subrogative pursuits for medical benefits conferred upon in-
lured governmental employees. For obvious reasons, the government
may b-e interested in shouldering the expenses of hospitalization and med-
ical payments incurred by an employee following an accident. This gov-
ernmental contribution is financed by the general budget. Subrogation
against a tortfeasor responsible for personal injury would thus shift the
loss from the general public to whoever may be responsible for the
accident-in most cases the motoring public. If drivers can be considered
better targets than the general public to absorb the cost-m itself a doubt-
ful premise-it seems that a driving tax or highway toll could be more
justified as a potential source of financing accident losses than general
taxation. If the correct source were selected to pay for the loss, sub-
rogation actions and the resulting cost of recovery could be eliminated.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated that it is well aware of this
dilemma. When the federal government paid for the hospitalization and
medical treatment of a serviceman negligently injured by a third party,
the Court in United States v. Standard Oil Co 64 refused to allow the
government to recover against the tortfeasor. The Court stated: "The
issue comes down in final consequence to a question of federal fiscal
policy, coupled with considerations concerning the need for an appro-
priateness of means to be used in executing the policy sought to be estab-
lished. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the
custodian of the national purse." 65
Responding to the Court's denial of a right of recovery, Congress en-
acted the Medical Care Recovery Act.66 This statute confers upon the
government a right of action for all expenses incurred in providing hos-
pital, medical, and dental care to a government employee negligently
injured by a third party
The Act has been received with enthusiasm by courts and academic
64. 332 U.S. 301 (1947)
65. Id. at 314.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1970). In pertinent part, the statute provides:
In any case in which the Umted States is authorized or required by law
to furnish hospital, medical, surgical or dental care and treatment to
a person who is injured or suffers a disease under circumstances creating
a tort liability upon some third person to pay damages therefor, the
United States shall have a right to recover from said third person the rea-
sonable value of the care and treatment so furnished and to be furnished
and shall, as to this~right, be subrogated to any right or claim that the in-
jured or diseased person has against such third person to the extent




writers. 7 The courts have declared that the statutory substitution is
umimpatred by most of the obstacles usually interfering with the enforce-
ment of a subrogated claim. For example, one court has stated that the
right of action is unaffected by a shorter limitation period relating to
personal injuries because the government's claim is not for personal in-
juries.68 It also has been held that a release given by an injured employee
to the tortfeasor does not discharge the latter's obligation to the federal
government, nor does the government have to notify the tortfeasor of its
pending subrogation claim at the time of the settlement negotiations
between the employee and the wrongdoer. 69 Furthermore, despite a con-
ceivable due process problem, the government's list of expenses submitted
to the tortfeasor in the subrogation proceedings has been held to be con-
clusive and not open to attack.70 Finally, a federal district court has sanc-
tioned the possibility of exposing the torifeasor to two different lawsuits
occurring simultaneously in different courtrooms.7 1
Amdst all the favorable judicial response and academic blessing, as
well as the proliferation of other legislation promoting a similar approach
to the problem of loss allocation,72 one must pause to consider the basics
of the problem. An examination of the legislative history behind the
Medical Care Recovery Act reveals only scant evidence of any deliber-
ate congressional policy.7 The bill has qmte obviously arisen from a desire
to undo the Supreme Court's denial of subrogation,74 but apart from
that purpose and from the hollow argument that subrogation would
eliminate windfall recoveries under the collateral source rule,75 the con-
gressional history is silent.
67. Long, Govermnent Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Recovery Act, 14 S.DL.
REv. 20 (1969) See also Gotting, Recovery, of Medical Expenses and the Medical Care
Recovery Act, 20 JAG J. 75 (1965-66); Turner, Hosntal Recovery Clams (42 U.S.C.
2651): The US. as a Subrogee, 12 A.F JAG L. REv. 44 (1970). Very few voices have
registered a protest against the constant expansion of the application of the Act. But see
Criterion Ins. Co. v. Starkes, 249 Md. 694, 241 A.2d 707 (1968).
68. Umted States v. Fort Benning Rifle & Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1967).
70. United States v. Jones, 264 F Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967).
71. United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp, 309 F. Supp. 1246 (WD. Va. 1970).
72. See, e.g., Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 751 et seq. (1970);
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970); Rail-
road Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 362 (o) (1970).
73. See Comment, The Medical Care Recovery Act, 23 RuTERas L. REv. 141 (1968).
74. See Letter of the Comptroller General of the Umted States to Sen. James East-
land, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, United States
Code Cong. & Admmistrative News 2654 (May 28, 1962).
75. See Statement in United States Code Cong. & Adminstrative News 2637-40
(1962). See also United States v. Jones, 264 F Supp. 11 (ED. Va. 1967)'.
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The Medical Care Recovery Act is an antisocial piece of legislation
because it relieves the federal government of a given financial burden and
xeallocates it to individuals or small groups. It does exactly the opposite
of statutory schemes which shift financial losses from individuals regard-
less of wrongdoing to society at large. Although it may not be improper
to unsocialize a risk, it is disturbing that no deliberate intention to ac-
complish that goal is apparent on the record. Moreover, if the attempt
was deliberate, it could have been better served by funding medical com-
pensation through taxation of the target enterprise rather than by taxing
the general public and wasting a part of the proceeds in subrogation re-
coveries.
Workmen's Compensation Legislation
A similar problem is presented within the framework of workmen's
compensation legislation. Subrogation of a workmen's compensation fund
against the negligent third party frustrates the worker's attempt to be
truly indemnified and works hardship on the tortfeasor. For that
reason, it is highly undesirable" and is not permitted in the absence of
a subrogation statute." Such statutes, however, exist in nearly all states,
and their effect is often much harsher than common law subrogation
would have been. For example, they sometimes shift to the third party the
burden of all expenses incurred by the carrier, without allowing the
third party to challenge the amount.78 Often the carrier is permitted to
be reimbursed from portions of the third party recovery allocable to
pain and suffering for which it had not previously compensated the
Vctmi.
79
When the concept of subrogation is applied judicially outside the
scope of the statute, the courts appear to be convinced that an important
social policy is being served by their zeal. 0 In cases of difficult statutory
interpretation, doubts usually sl are resolved in favor of a broad interpre-
76. Hardman, The Common Law Right of Subrogatton Under Workmen's Compen-
sation Acts, 26 W VA. L.Q. 183 (1920).
77. A. LAsox, supra note 28, § 74.11; Kimball & Davis, supra note 13, at 847
78. E.g., Cm. LABoR CODE § 3854 (West 1955). See Lasky, Expanded Scope of Recov-
ery in Industrial Third Party Litigation, 41 CAL. S.B.J. 383 (1966).
79. E.g., Jordan v. Orcutt, 279 Mass. 413, 181 N.E. 661 (1932).
80. See, e.g., Richardson v. Saint Charles-St. John the Baptist Bridge & Ferry Authority,
284 F Supp. 709 (ED. La. 1968).
81. This is not always the case. For a recent illustratqon of a narrow Interpretation,
-perhaps symbolic of a change of attitude, see Anderson, v. Borough of Greenville, 442
Pa. 11, 273 A.2d 512 (1971)..
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tation of the subrogation clause.82 All in all, the workmen's compensation
area is marked by a complete victory of the concept of subrogation,
arrested by a carefully drafted statute and thus effectively immune from
judicial review The purpose behind it all is that, in the name of social-
izing a risk, it is again being unsocialized; it merely alleviates the right
of the immediate victim, the injured employee, and sacrifices the third
party instead. The system disregards torts committed by the injured em-
ployee, whose individual blameworthiness is considered irrelevant for
purposes of awarding him the statutory benefits, yet it penalizes the
wrongdoing of the unlucky third party, who may happen to be an em-
ployee himself or, even worse, an unemployed or unemployable person.
The rationale for the conflicting statutory trends cannot be explained
by a desire to protect insureds qua insureds regardless of consequences
vis-6-vis nonmsureds. It is common for many automobile liability insur-
ance statutes, for example, to subrogate judgment creditors of a negli-
gent insured driver to the driver's liability policy against the carrier.8 3 A
social statute striving for public welfare cannot victimize some indi-
viduals, arbitrarily scattered among all sectors of society, in the name of
rescuing others. The broad spectrum of important issues necessitates a
thorough revision.
CONCLUSION
Most accident victims with severe economic losses are not indemnified
by either their insurance carriers or independent sources. Despite the
fact that nine out of ten seriously injured persons receive some compen-
sation8 4 for economic losses, 5 those with the greatest loss do not receive
reparations of more than one-fifth of their total econonuc loss.86 From
thus one-fifth, the most frequent subrogees, medical benefit carriers,
usually pay only a small share-m severe cases they pay as little as five
percent.87 These statistics relate, of course, only to compensation for
82. E.g., City of St. Paul v. Sorenson, 283 Minn. 158, 167 N.W.2d 17 (1969). In Min-
nesota, a tort action for personal injuries dies with the person of the plaintiff. The court
nevertheless held that a deceased's carrier is subrogated to the claim of the tortfeasor.
83. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 38-175 (1958), applied m Bourget v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Corp., 313 F Supp. 367 (D. Conn. 1970); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Williamson, 153 Conn. 345, 216 A.2d 635 (1966). Compare the English
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act, 20 & 21 Geo. 5 (1930).
84. Of whatever source: medical, life, auto or collision insurance, tort recoveries,
workmen's compensation, social security, etc.
85. EcoNoMIc CONSEQUENcES OF Au-roMoBmE AccImEr INuaiEs 37 (1970).
86. Id. at 39.
87. d. at 45.
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economic losses, which usually are much smaller than the victim's justi-
fied expectation to be compensated for pain and suffering.
Because an accident victim is almost never truly compensated, subro-
gation should be demed to health insurers. In a few rare cases, the vic-
tm's economic loss may be fully compensated and his general damages
partly or wholly satisfied through third party tort action. In that extra-
ordinary contingency, the case against subrogation is considerably weak-
er. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that whatever the compensation,
the value of life and a healthy body is much greater, and no double re-
covery would possibly befall the victim if he should be permitted to col-
lect from both the third party and the collateral source.
This analysis does not exclude the possibility of a nonsubrogative re-
covery by the insurer against a defaulting third party Recovery in this
context should be denied only to the extent that it defeats the victim's
expectation of indemnification. If a full recovery to the insured is guar-
anteed, there seems to be no theoretical reason to exclude an additional
recovery by the victim's carrier to the extent of the value of the benefits
paid. Since the tortfeasor has already paid once for his wrongdoing, and
since his ability to bear risks or spread losses would a priori be inferior
to the underwriter's, this new right of recovery should be permitted only
after thorough consideration of the relative equities.88
88. In some extraordinary cases, a negligent interference by the tortfeasor with the
contractual relations between the victim and his insurer also should suffice to justify
recovery. Thus, where an individual has been injured by the negligent act of a third
party, medical expenses consequently incurred by his or her spouse are chargeable to the
tortfeasor in an action brought by the spouse in his or her own behalf. Saunders v Schultz,
20 Il. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960) Where the injured person is a married woman, her
husband can sue not only for the immediate economic expenditure but also for more re-
mote items such as loss of consortium. Kilkenny v. Kenney, 68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149
(1961).
The cases discussed above and situations of interference with a medical benefits in-
surance policy are rather analogous. In denying such an analogy, the California Supreme
Court said: "The analogy must fall because the wife's recovery depended upon
familial status and the duty of. support of her husband imposed on her by statutory
law while plaintiff's claim for recovery is based solely upon a contractual liability
between itself and decedent." Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073,
7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960). It is difficult to perceive in this context the difference between
contractual and statutory obligations, and it is submitted that the distinction is without
a difference. Naturally, a wife would be in a poorer position to spread her economic
losses than an insurance carrier, and some of her losses, such as loss of consortium,
would be completely unspreadable. This distinction justifies a greater generosity in
recognizing her independent tort right than in recognizing that of the underwriter. The
question is one of degree and not principle, however. Moreover, in cases where it would
not seem desirable to grant the underwriter an independent right of action, there is no
reason to uphold its subrogative claims.
